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Abstract 
The assertion on which this paper is based is that Capitalism has been superseded by Corporatism. I 
put forward an argument as to why Marxist scholars can and should abandon the idea that Capitalism 
still exists based on Marx’s approach to understanding political economy. Further, I argue that Marx’s 
method can be deployed to better understand and change the corporatist system in which we are 
currently living first by understanding what it means to be “labour” in a system governed by complex 
structures of debt.  
Overview 
The central assertion I wish to defend in this paper is that capitalism no longer exists as a 
social relation of production and that it has been superseded by a corporatist system. The 
question I am asking of Marx's work is therefore largely methodological. The Marxian 
concepts of ‘labour’ and ‘consciousness’ provide a focus on what I perceive to be a flaw in 
much contemporary analysis of global political economy, Marxian or otherwise. That flaw is 
the insistence that we continue to live in some form of capitalism or other. I argue that the 
system of political economy currently exerting the most force on contemporary social change 
is corporatist, and therefore technically fascist (if we take Mussolini’s definition). 
What I want to show here is that Marx's method of analysis, especially evident in his earlier 
work, remains useful for political economic analysis in corporatism and any subsequent 
systems that emerge from it. I proceed by framing conceptions of labour and consciousness 
within what I understand to be the most relevant aspects of Marx's approach for 
understanding contemporary political economy: namely, his dialectical method and historical 
materialist framework. I argue that it is unhelpful for Marxians to retain the terms and tenets 
of Capital for understanding a system that flourishes primarily by propagating impostures of 
capitalist behaviours. Further, by holding fast to discussions about capitalism in the current 
context, the overall effect is to obscure the corporatist character of the system and its 
historical meaning.  
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“Labour” and its referent 
In classical political economy, labour is a factor of production, a variable cost. What 
supposedly distinguishes labour in capitalist relations is its status as a commodity. I have 
had a number of discussions with fellow Marxists who insist that as long as labour is a 
commodity we must accept that we are still ensconced in a capitalist form of political 
economy. I disagree that this is necessarily the case.2 As far as I see it, Marx's definitive 
comments on the essence of labour are the following, if for no other reason than they 
contain a specific element that changed very little throughout the course of his scholarship: 
what is called “labour” in Capital is essentially an historically specific designation for the 
mediating relationship between humans and the rest of nature: 
[1] workers can create nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It 
is the material in which labour realizes itself, in which it is active and from which, and 
by means of which, it produces. (Marx, 1844/1972) 
Quote [1] is from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), one of Marx’s earliest 
works in political economy. Later, Marx emphasises that labour not only realises itself in 
nature but is a force of nature:  
[2] Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much a source of use values 
… as labour, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labour 
power. (Marx, 1875/1972: 382)  
Quote [2] is from Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Program, written thirty years after the 
Manuscripts. Again, labour is both a part of nature, as well as the subjective (by which I 
mean active) aspect of human existence in relation to the rest of nature. Later, in volume 
three of Capital, he criticises the bourgeois economists’ conception of labour because it is  
[3] nothing but an abstraction and taken by itself cannot exist at all, or, if we take what 
is actually meant here, [labour is] the entire productive activity of man, through which 
his metabolic interchange with nature is mediated (1981: 954 my emphasis).  
Marx is critical of this conception of labour in the context of Capital because it is unhistorical 
and permits no analysis of social relations in respect of Capital which is an historically 
specific relation of production. Throughout his work, Marx suggests that the essence of 
“labour”—its universal referent—transcends class and historically specific social relations 
however defined because it is nothing less than humanity’s interactions with each other and 
the rest of nature. Marx’s distinction between productive and unproductive labour made in 
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Capital (1976) and elsewhere is based on whether surplus value is extracted from particular 
types of labour. Given the orientation of my argument here—that capitalism no longer 
exists—a more “universal” definition of human-nature interactions delineates a particular 
aspect of humanity through which to analyse what was “labour” in Capital has become in 
global Corporatism. Moreover, the widespread talk of “a global knowledge economy” 
indicates that the entire spectrum of human energies has been subsumed under systemic 
appropriation regimes, thereby giving all human energies the character of universally 
productive labour. From the “audience labour” of mass mediated societies (Smythe, 1981), 
to the “hard labour” of mining and building industries, to the “cheap” piecework of low-paid 
factory workers throughout the developing world, to the “leisure” industries, to exercise 
factories, to legalised prostitution and corporate childcare systems, the entire spectrum of 
human activity now exists within corporatist frameworks of value extraction. It is conceivable 
that such a comprehensive system of appropriation could exist within Capitalist social 
relations. But there are three main features of corporatism that delineate it from capitalism: 
the dispersion of ownership through a generalised savings system (pensions and retirement 
funds,  superannuation, equity markets); the separation of ownership from control; and a 
generalised credit system that extends from individuals to whole nations.  
The basic premise of Marx’s analysis of Capital is that it is a system unique in being geared 
solely towards commodity production in pursuit of increased exchange-values. It is therefore 
a system of self-valorising values. It is divided into two great classes: the owners of the 
means of production (Capitalists) and those who work for them (Labour). Universal 
commodity circulation through various media of exchange is the presupposition of Capital. 
Workers are reduced to the status of commodities because their mode of participation in this 
system entails them selling their energies to capitalists thereby creating systemic 
antagonism between the two classes. Commodity consciousness—the ceaseless pursuit of 
exchange-values in exchange for human life force—pervades the consciousness of workers 
and capitalists alike. This is of course a great simplification of Marx’s analysis. However, the 
point I wish to make is this: Marx proceeds from the assumption that the way we produce, 
which includes our motivations for doing so and the social character of what we produce, 
defines who we are in relation to the system in which we produce. Simultaneously, the 
relationships that characterise an historically specific system of production imbue its 
constituents with the tenets and terms of that peculiar system, thereby making the system 
seem universal and immutable.  
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From wage labour to debt serviceability 
Given that Marx’s approach was useful for understanding the character of capitalism, let us 
consider the relationships that constitute the current system. It is my contention that the 
corporatist system is premised on the production of exchange-values in the future tense, or 
put simply: debt. Corporatism is characterised by a system in which the production, 
distribution, circulation, and exchange of indebtedness dominates the consciousness of its 
constituents. Debt consciousness has begun to pervade societies and their constituents 
throughout the world at every level. Credit underpins the corporatist system’s feudal 
character because it provides the basis of loyal “service” and is the realisation of corporate 
benefice for that service. Marx describes the moral basis of the credit system:  
[4] Credit is the economic judgement on the morality of a man. In the credit system 
man replaces metal or paper as the mediator of exchange. However, he does this not 
as a man but as the incarnation of capital and interest … Human individuality, human 
morality, have become both articles of commerce and the material which money 
inhabits. The substance, the body clothing the spirit of money is not money, paper, but 
instead it is my personal existence, my flesh and blood, my social worth and status. 
Credit no longer actualizes money-values in actual money but in human flesh and in 
human hearts. (Marx 1844 [1975]: 264)  
In a universalised credit system, “labour” is no longer a commodity, it is literally “human 
capital”—people are exchange values set in the future tense so that we are worth only what 
we owe.  
The rise of consumer credit, national and international systems of credit, the proliferation of 
privately issued money, and the means of global communication linking these systems of 
debt provide the basis of a system that was unthinkable in Marx’s day. The historical 
movement of money-as-medium has resulted in humanity making itself the expression of 
exchange values. Consequently the credit system (which is many systems more or less 
closely linked) is a systematic claim upon massive amounts of future human life. Trade in 
abstract forms of money constitutes roughly 99.9% of all “trade”, and new forms of tradable 
debt continue to proliferate at an astonishing rate (cf. Hart 1999; Saul 1997; Graham, 2006). 
The bulk of transactions that occur within the globally mediated system that has cynically 
been called “the knowledge economy” is constituted of nothing less than claims on future 
life. It is the mass “monetisation” of past and present human life and its subsequent 
mortgage against some imagined future based on actuarial calculation. The result is a mass 
indenture of future human life to the service of corporatised debt. The movement from 
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capitalism to corporatism is in large part an achievement of expert discourse, particularly the 
languages of law, finance, policy, and econometrics.  
Credit is money in the subjunctive mood; it is the future-in-present expression of potential 
human life calculated in terms of exchange-values. In Marx’s description of credit [4], we see 
a recognition that the credit system contains in embryonic form the total colonisation of 
social values – spiritual, cultural, social, economic, and moral – by monetary values. The 
credit system transforms people into mere materials of commerce and the material which 
money inhabits. In all its future tenses, money infuses human flesh and human hearts, and 
with these, human imaginations. With the emergence of a more or less generalised credit 
system, money values are no longer expressed in the alien, objectified forms of paper, gold, 
or silver, but in personal existence, flesh and blood, social worth and status: today, “human” 
and “social” capital have very literal meanings. But the movement does not stop at the 
colonisation of individuals. 
From student loans and credit card debt; from consumer debt to household debt to national 
debt; from partisan political debts to personal financial favours, the oppressive character of 
debt now fills the imaginations of people everywhere. Rather than working for one’s living, 
people in advanced and developing societies now work to “service”, “manage”, or “retire” 
their debt. This holds as much for entire nations as it does for individuals. Listen to 
Australia’s Prime Minister, John Howard:  
[5] Well [the treasurer] has unveiled a larger than expected surplus. It just shows how 
well the economy is growing and how well it’s being managed by the Government. … 
Self evidently we are very keen to retire debt. We inherited a mortgage of $96 billion 
from Mr Beazley and we’re very happy to have been in a position of repaying almost 
$53 billion dollars of that by the end of this financial year. (Howard, 2000)  
There is a significant systemic shift evident in such utterances. The nation has become an 
entity to be managed. It has a mortgage, a debt owed to someone or something, though to 
whom or what is almost always unspecified. In corporatism, excellent national management 
will retire debt, remain creditworthy, and create a surplus. In this view, civic institutions of the 
“welfare state” become an impediment, and the governance of entire nations takes the form 
of a Harvard Business School case-study. The administrative unit (nation, state, province, or 
municipality) is viewed by its management as a corporate entity that must operate efficiently. 
But what it is that must be done so “efficiently” is rarely specified.  
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Managing the Corporatist State 
The following is from George W. Bush’s The President’s Management Agenda (2001) and 
further indicates that capitalist era institutions of governance are becoming an encumbrance 
to effective administration of corporatism because they lack the flexibility of “private” 
institutions:  
[6] Federal managers are greatly limited in how they can use available financial and 
human resources to manage programs; they lack much of the discretion given to their 
private sector counterparts to do what it takes to get the job done. Red tape still 
hinders the efficient operation of government organizations; excessive control and 
approval mechanisms afflict bureaucratic processes. Micro-management from various 
sources—Congressional, departmental, and bureau—imposes unnecessary 
operational rigidity. (Bush, 2001: 5) 
And, from Britain, the corporatist and feudal character of the current system is evidenced in 
the Blair Government’s development of a National Asset Register, British government’s first 
effort to estimate the fiscal worth of everything it “owns” since 1086: 
[7] The government will this week publish its National Asset Register – the “Domesday 
Book” of all the assets owned by the government with their monetary values. […] The 
Treasury, hopes the register can be a key tool in improving the efficiency of the public 
sector, by making it possible to calculate whether government departments are getting 
good value for money out of property and other assets. […] A Treasury official said 
“Departments now have the tools, the information and the incentives they need to 
improve the productivity of their assets”. (Crooks 2001)  
The historical implications of such statements are far reaching. Governments at all levels 
now see themselves as management teams, and the domain over which they exercise 
authority is reduced to the status of a corporation. They are agents of productivity, owners of 
assets, and the promoters of managerially defined efficiencies.  
Marx notes that within the capitalist class, specifically in the domain of financial control, a 
‘further division of labour’ develops, ‘both a division into various branches independent of 
one another, and the development of the workplace within these branches (large offices, 
numerous book-keepers and cashiers, and far-reaching division of labour)’ (1981: 433). His 
definition of labour includes the intermediaries of capital, such as managers (1981: 506-9). 
He makes a qualitative distinction on the basis of social function and possessive antagonism 
between managerial labour and ‘social labour’ more generally (1981: 509):  
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[8] This work of management and supervision, in so far as it is not simply a particular 
function arising from the nature of all combined social labour … arises from the 
opposition between the owner of the means of production and the owner of mere 
labour-power - whether labour-power is bought with the worker himself, as in the slave 
system, or alternatively the worker sells his own labour-power, so that the production 
process appears at the same time as a process of consumption of labour by capital. 
(1981: 509).  
This definition is worth some consideration given the political utterances and initiatives I 
have cited above. It goes to the very definition of capitalism itself. For the purposes of my 
argument regarding the passing of capitalism, the key concept here is the notion of “owners 
of the means of production”. This is a core element in Marx's definition of capitalist relations 
(1973, 1970, 1976, 1981) and is the basis of his theory of the ‘two great classes’ that 
characterise capital as a system of social relations: owners of means of production and 
wage-labourers.  
Ownership, labour, and the production of corporatist consciousness 
In the current system ownership is not identical to control. Ownership of the most influential 
systems of production is now dispersed among, or invested in, corporate “persons”, or 
corporations, or combinations thereof. They are fictions of law whose appointed 
representatives now overtly exercise direct influence in the course of human affairs. The 
utterances of political leaders from throughout the world, such as those quoted above in [5], 
[6], [7], and [8], indicate that government administrations see themselves as owners of 
productive assets, with administration being responsible for the assets’ “productivity”. These 
“assets” consist of debt-burdened people, whether directly indebted or paying for national 
debt through poverty, homelessness, ill-health, organised violence, or early death. An often 
repeated dictum of corporatist political representatives is that the “property” of governments 
is public property, but that such property is better off being “privatised”, by which is meant 
placing public infrastructure under corporate control—per the doctrine of “privatisation”—to 
create increased efficiencies (Saul, 1997). Transfers of massive public infrastructure—jails, 
transport, health, education, and warfare—to corporate interests continues throughout the 
world at an accelerating rate. This has an unusual effect on the composition of labour, even 
in the most extreme of circumstances  
[9] Private corporations have penetrated western warfare so deeply that they are now 
the second biggest contributor to coalition forces in Iraq after the Pentagon, a 
Guardian investigation has established.  
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While the official coalition figures list the British as the second largest contingent with around 
9,900 troops, they are narrowly outnumbered by the 10,000 private military contractors now 
on the ground (Traynor, 2003) 
Private contractors have become so entangled in US-led military operations that the military 
can literally not do without them (Traynor, 2003). This is Lewis Mumford’s theory of 
“organisation man” writ large.  
Corporatist modes of ownership and the mobilisation of future labour 
Corporatist modes of ownership are of great significance in understanding corporatist social 
relations. We can begin to do so by focusing our investigation at the institutional level. For 
example, there has been much made in recent times of mutual funds and their influence on 
“the economy”, especially in respect of poor (if not criminal) corporate governance. Legal 
malfeasance aside, corporations have been key in the dispersion of ownership, the 
centralisation of control, and the separation of control from ownership. The practical effect of 
corporatised pools of funds, in combination with compulsory savings policies throughout the 
developed world (e.g. superannuation, 401K plans, etc) and myriad “off balance-sheet” 
financial instruments, has been to mobilise a vast pool of personal savings that provides the 
basis of a system in which circulation of exchange values becomes the primary determinant 
and measure of economic “success” and productivity. In turn, by exercising control over the 
bulk of exchange-values, and by being charged with the continual increase in the value of 
these exchange-values, these types of corporations help to disperse ownership to the point 
at which, at any given time, it is often impossible for individual persons to know where or in 
what their savings are invested, or for how long.  
The hoard that people put aside for their future, either through taxation or enforced pension 
plans, is now used by mutual funds, banks, and other financial institutions as gambling 
stakes in the global market for shares, derivatives, bonds, and manifold forms of debt and 
insurance. The direct result of this is that people often have no idea what they own or what 
their savings actually mean in terms of real ownership. We therefore have no possibility of 
exercising control in the entities and projects in which our monies may be invested. The 
institutional points at which public savings are pooled and mobilised are the points at which 
ownership and control are separated. Simultaneously they are the points at which control 
becomes more centralised as ownership becomes more dispersed, anonymous, ephemeral, 
and socialised.  
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From a Marxian perspective it is ironic that the institutional mechanisms that have enabled 
the closest approximation of “social ownership of the means of production” have 
simultaneously enabled the separation of ownership from any meaningful function in the 
control of political economic conditions. For the relatively few corporate persons that 
exercise control over the bulk of exchange-values, the pool of “assets” they control provide a 
means through which power can be “leveraged” at a hitherto unprecedented scale and 
scope. For example, Rupert Murdoch can exercise control over a global media empire by 
owning less than 15 percent of the company's equity. That is the notion of a “controlling 
interest” in corporate governance. Here is how changes in such arrangements are 
communicated to the public in official terms, and how a relatively small share in one 
corporation can be translated into a larger share of another (the mechanism is debt): 
[10] This page provides information on the joint application filed by General Motors 
Corporation (“GM”), Hughes Electronics Corporation (“Hughes”) and The News 
Corporation Limited ("News Corp." and, collectively with GM and Hughes, the 
"Applicants") to the Commission seeking consent to transfer control of various 
Commission licenses and authorizations, including direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”) 
and fixed satellite space station, earth station, and terrestrial wireless authorizations 
held by Hughes and its wholly- or majority-owned subsidiaries to News Corp. 
(“Application”). The proposed transaction involves the split-off of Hughes from GM, 
wherein Hughes will become a separate and independent company, followed by a 
series of transactions where News Corp., through its majority-held subsidiary, Fox 
Entertainment Group, will acquire a 34% interest in Hughes. The remaining 66% 
interest in Hughes will be held by three GM employee benefit trusts (managed by an 
independent trustee), which combined will hold an approximately 20% interest in 
Hughes, and by the general public, which will hold an approximately 46% interest in 
Hughes. (Federal Communications Commission, 2003) 
Note the complex combination of interests expressed here. Three corporate persons, News 
Corporation, General Motors, and Hughes Electronics Corporation, have proposed an 
arrangement that gives a single person control over a global, extra terrestrial media 
system—the sole purpose of which is to produce forms of consciousness on a global scale—
by mobilising employee benefit trusts and the money of “the general public”.3 Such an 
arrangement would not have been possible a mere 25 years ago.  
To emphasise the complexity of ownership expressed here, it is worth noting that it is not 
News Corporation that owns a controlling interest in Hughes Electronics. It is to be owned by 
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Fox, a subsidiary of News Corp. Murdoch owns a controlling interest of less than 15 percent 
in News Corp. As the above example demonstrates, a “controlling interest” in one major 
corporation can be leveraged to exercise ownership of more and more subsidiary 
corporations with larger and larger shareholdings by piling mortgage upon mortgage at arm’s 
distance through corporate structures and the deployment of debt.  
In this situation, debt is revealed as the oppressive weapon that it is. The following is a 
report of a hostile move on the Murdoch “empire”:  
[11] With 48m voting shares – some bought in the open market – and 210m non-voting 
shares, Liberty now has an total equity stake of 17pc, making it the biggest single 
shareholder. The Murdoch family owns 13pc of the equity, but retains 30pc of the 
votes. […]  
The surprise deal raised questions over the future of the News Corp empire. 
Theoretically, Mr Malone could swap more of his non-voting stock for shares with 
voting rights, thus increasing his influence on the company. But he would find it difficult 
to wrest control from the Murdoch family. 
At present they are protected by a number of “poison pill” defences, including one 
stating that all of News Corp's $8.7billion debt falls due if there is a change of control 
at the company. (Litterick, 2004) 
Here corporate control and debt are revealed as key levers in the new political economy. 
News Corp’s debt is Murdoch’s protection over his personal control. The threat is that 
Murdoch’s deferred debt will become real debt, due now if he or his family loses control. This 
is how, at each step in the corporate process of leveraging “controlling interests”, an 
increasing number of relatively minor shareholdings gets transformed into control over larger 
and larger amounts of labour, by which I mean human activity in general.  
Universal labour and the emergence of corporate consciousness 
It is in this very general sense that Marx provides a useful distinction that is perhaps best 
seen as a distinction between synchronic and diachronic aspects of labour. It is the 
distinction between  
[12] universal labour and communal labour. Both kinds play their role in the process of 
production, both flow one into the other, but both are also differentiated. Universal 
labour is all scientific work, all discovery and invention. It is brought about partly by the 
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cooperation of men now living, but partly also by building on earlier work. Communal 
labour, however, simply involves the direct cooperation of individuals (1981: 198).  
In his definition of ‘universal labour’, Marx includes the productive forces of people 
throughout history, their intellectual and cultural activities, their technologies, and the various 
modes of relatedness through which they have passed. As Marx points out, the distinction 
between universal and communal labour is somewhat problematic because it is clear that 
these two broadly defined forms of labour are intimately entangled at any time—they are 
literally two different views of social relatedness at any particular time: synchronic and 
diachronic. Such a distinction is especially problematic in the presence of a “knowledge” or 
“information” economy, in which even certain forms of thinking and representing are counted 
as productive forces.  
While any neat division between “manual” and “intellectual” labour is patently false (Schiller 
1996: 20-1), it is worth seeing the difference between diachronic and synchronic views of 
labour in terms of social knowledge, especially in what is being widely touted as a 
knowledge economy. In one view, the diachronic, we see that all knowings, all expertise, all 
techniques have their social and historical provenances. In the other view, the synchronic, 
we see how specific interactions instantiate, comprise, and transform the communal (or 
social) production and reproduction of universal labour at any particular time. The two views 
are inseparable in characterising a system of social relations. A knowledge economy, for 
example, is an economy that presupposes more and less valuable ways of knowing. Such 
ways of knowing are produced in rarefied contexts (such as universities, banks, or corporate 
board rooms), distributed, valorised, and exchanged in various forms of language “made” for 
and by different groups of people.4 A corollary to this, considering the ‘division of intellectual 
labour’ (Jarvis 1998, pp. 87-88) that knowledge of varying values presumes, is that certain 
dialects—or ways of representing—are more readily valorised than others, largely because 
of their institutional context of production. To clarify: valuable knowledge is necessarily the 
product of valorised institutional contexts, and vice versa (Bourdieu, 1991). Throughout 
history, valorised dialects have played an important role in creating ‘knowledge monopolies’ 
and socially dominant classes, as have other technologies that the “owners” of sacred 
knowledge deploy (cf. Innis, 1950). Such dialects have, at various times, included those of 
politicians, scientists, priests, lawyers, economists, kings, and so on (cf Lemke, 1995: chapt. 
4). The inalienably political character of such dialects converges with their social and 
historical origins: 
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[13] The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a 
definite way enter into … definite social and political relations. Empirical observation 
must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and 
speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The 
social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite 
individuals … The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first 
directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourses of men [sic], 
the language of real life … The same applies to mental production as expressed in the 
language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics etc. of a people. … If in all 
ideology men [sic] and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera 
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the 
inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process (Marx & Engels, 
1846/1972: 123-124). 
This much-cited view is a synthesis of universal and communal labour, as described above. 
Apart from identifying the social and historical links between labour and consciousness, 
Marx and Engels identify the obfuscatory nature of valorised dialects and their relationship 
with other forms of social production and reproduction, including the links between 
historically specific forms of social consciousness and historical context. Valorised dialects, 
when viewed as materially enacted, socially embedded products, take on the appearance of 
objective “things”. That is because language is ultimately entangled in the labour of 
conscious distinctions: ‘Language is practical consciousness’ (Marx & Engels, 1846/1972: 
124). Therefore a critical examination of how consciousness is actively produced implies a 
perspective grounded in a critical analysis of which meanings are most influential and how 
such meanings are produced and reproduced. Such an approach, I argue, is at the core of 
Marx’s analytical framework. Furthermore, I believe it to be as useful for understanding the 
debt-laden consciousness of corporatism as it was when Marx used it to analyse nineteenth 
century capitalist relations.  
Marx, social analysis, and critical method 
Norman Fairclough and I (2002) have detailed elsewhere an argument for understanding 
how Marx’s dialectical method can be seen as a form of what is now called “critical discourse 
analysis”, among other things. More broadly, Marx’s is a socially grounded, historically 
informed method of critical language analysis designed to challenge and change 
orthodoxies. Some have suggested that Marx lacked a systematic ‘theory of language’ (e.g. 
Cook, 1982: 530; Lepschy, 1985). But that is to entirely overlook the foundations of 
nineteenth century scholarship. Marx’s contribution to qualitative social analysis, especially 
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his contribution to critical language analysis (however named), cannot be understood without 
taking into account the enduring influence of classical scholarship throughout most of the 
nineteenth century (Bloom, 1943). Nor can we grasp the centrality of critical language 
analysis to Marx’s method without taking into account Marx’s philosophical and juridical 
education in Germany at a time when Hegel’s philosophy was considered to be a 
revolutionary intellectual force (cf. Bloom, 1943; Colletti, 1975: 46; Hook, 1928a,b: 114; 
Tucker, 1972: xvii-xviii). An understanding of language was central to scholarship during the 
time Marx studied. It was, in fact, the foundation of nineteenth century classical scholarship 
(Adorno, 1973: 56, 1994: 18-21, 116-118; Cook, 1982: 530; Grote, 1872).  
Fairclough and I identified three conceptual elements that are central to understanding the 
“critical linguistic” aspects of Marx’s method of analysis. The elements we highlight are: the 
doctrine of abstraction, the nineteenth century conception of Aristotle’s dialectic, and the 
late-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century conceptions of ideology, the philosophical 
counterpart of post-revolutionary political economy in France and Germany. When we trace 
these themes out in their historical context, what we find in Marx’s formulation of dialectics is 
an intense mixture of naturalism and humanism intertwined with a discursive and relational 
approach to analysing social phenomena (Fairclough and Graham, 2002). I only have time 
here to touch on what I think is the most relevant and overt aspect of Marx’s method for 
understanding the changes that we are going through: dialectics.  
As developed in the classical system, dialectical arguments have ‘for their province words 
and discourse; they are ... powers or accomplishments of discourse’ (Grote, 1872: 384). 
Dialectical arguments are therefore primarily concerned with language. Dialectic focuses on 
Endoxa, ‘premises, propositions and problems’ that are ‘borrowed from some one among the 
varieties of accredited or authoritative opinions’ – from ‘a particular country’, ‘an intelligent 
majority’ or from ‘a particular school of philosophers or wise individuals’ (1872: 383). Endoxa 
are found ‘exclusively in the regions of ... received opinions’, and dialectical argumentation 
proceeds upon the assumption that in ‘every society there are floating beliefs, each carrying 
with it a certain measure of authority’ (385-6). Dialectics assumes that the beliefs and 
propositions common to a given community will often contradict each other. But they are an 
important focus for precisely for this reason—Endoxa form the basis of what we call 
“common sense”. Each individual, as they mature, ‘imbibes of these opinions and beliefs 
insensibly and without special or professional teaching’ (385). Consequently, they ‘carry with 
them more or less authority, and it is from them that the reasonings of common life ... are 
supplied’ (385).  
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Endoxic propositions carry with them an assumption of ‘probability’, precisely because of 
their status as authoritatively received or common opinion within a given social context (389-
90). Endoxa have ‘support from the mass of opinions and beliefs floating and carrying 
authority at the same time’, and dialectical analysis ‘is carried on within this wide field of 
floating opinions’ (389-90). The method is to search ‘for a “counter syllogism” of which the 
conclusion is contradictory’ (an antithesis) to the Endoxa it is investigating (390). Such a 
method does not proceed from first principles; rather, the purpose of deploying dialectics is 
to ‘open a new road to the first principia of each separate science’ (391). In any case, first 
principles ‘can never be scrutinized through the truths of the science itself, which 
presuppose them and are deduced from them’ (391). Such principles can only be challenged 
from outside a particular science, and dialectical argumentation is designed precisely for this 
purpose. Its most useful function is that of ‘dissipating the false persuasions of knowledge’ 
based on contradictory principles or taken-for-granted, commonsense beliefs and 
assumptions (391).  
The primary category of classical dialectics is Relation. Considered in the most 
comprehensive sense, all the dialectical categories ‘are implicated and subordinated to 
Relation’ (115-20). Relation, ‘understood in the large sense which really belongs to it, ought 
to be considered as an Universal, comprehending and pervading all the Categories’ (120). 
Consequently, new relations ‘may become predicable of a thing, without any change in the 
thing itself, but simply by changes in other things’ (122). As a method of inquiry dialectics 
can be described as a relational and social theory of language, a theory of language in use 
that is drawn from ‘common speech’, and which is inalienably bound up with social 
consciousness and relationships in a world which is assumed to be wholly social and 
material in its determination. The relational aspect of dialectical categories is therefore its 
most important. The relational aspect of dialectic is ‘not as one amongst many distinct 
Categories, but as implicated with all the Categories’ (Grote, 1872: 126).  
The primacy of the relational in classical dialectics can be seen throughout Marx’s early 
texts. The relational aspect of classical scholarship is organised around the concept of 
Relata (100-104). Relata are ‘said to be of other things, or are said to be in some manner 
towards something else’ (100). Thus, Relata are ‘so designated in virtue of their relation to 
another Correlata; the master is master of a servant – the servant is servant of a master’ 
(1872: 101; cf. also Hegel, 1807/1966: 228-40). Therefore ‘the Relatum and its Correlate 
seem to be simul naturâ. If you suppress one of the pair, the other vanishes’ (Grote, 1872: 
102).  
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Throughout Marx’s early work, through to the Grundrisse, we can clearly identify elements of 
the formal Aristotelian method modified by Hegel’s introduction of the dialectic to the time 
element. Dialectical terms such as “subjects and predicates”; “Ens”, “genus”, and “species”; 
“differentia and semblances”; “accidents and errors in language” and so on, pervade the 
texts. Marx quite clearly deploys elements of the dialectical method. Yet it would be 
misleading in the extreme to say that Marx relied solely upon language, or fetishised it in any 
way. He and Engels make this quite clear in the introduction to The German Ideology: 
[14] Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the 
products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the 
real chains of men … it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against 
these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of 
men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of consciousness, 
the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their 
present consciousness for human, critical, or egoistic consciousness, and thus 
removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to 
demands to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another 
interpretation. (1846/1972: 113) 
Like the latter-day social constructivists, the Young Hegelians fought phrases with phrases. I 
read Marx’s ‘language of real life’ as a many-sided metaphor for social praxis. His dialectical, 
historical materialist method recognises that meanings are produced in reciprocal 
relationship with the whole of social life and are expressions of the social relations in which 
they are produced.  
Marxian futures in global corporatism 
Nothing appears to irritate Marxists more than the suggestion that Capitalism is finished. 
Whether or not it is because without capitalism Marxians feel themselves to be irrelevant, or 
whether they are disappointed that a socialist utopia has not emerged from the womb of 
Capital, or whether I am entirely mistaken in announcing the passing of Capital, I honestly do 
not know. My reading of history leads me to believe that, as a social relation of production, 
Capital began rapidly vanishing from the end of the 1920s and that it had almost entirely 
disappeared by the mid-1950s. It seems to me that there have been more and less stable 
transitional systems in between Capitalism and Global Corporatism—State-Capitalism for 
example, perhaps even “hypercapitalism”—but that is not the point of my argument.  
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The point I wish to reiterate is this: regardless of what we call the current system, Marx’s 
method remains relevant. There are still social classes. There are still social relations of 
production. There are still sophisticated mechanisms of exploitation. There are – without a 
doubt – manifold new forces of production emerging every day, some that promise 
emancipation, some that threaten total annihilation, others that demand total obeisance. Yet 
if we cling steadfastly to the idea that Capital still exists as a social relation of production, we 
have to ask ourselves: on what grounds do we make such a claim? Where are the two great 
classes of capital, the owners of the means of production and the wage-labourers? Who 
should we put in those classes? And so on.  
If Marx taught us nothing else, he taught us that the orthodoxies produced in any system 
blind us to our actual conditions; that social relations change continually throughout history; 
that one day capital would inevitably wither and die. Bleak writer that he was, he promised 
nothing utopian to me, except perhaps an abiding faith in human nature, and therefore in 
nature itself:  
[15] Species-life, both for man and for animals, consists physically in the fact that man, 
like animals, lives from inorganic nature; and because man is more universal than 
animals, so too is the area of inorganic nature from which he lives more universal. Just 
as plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc., theoretically form a part of human 
consciousness, partly as objects of science and partly as objects of art — his spiritual 
inorganic nature, his spiritual means of life, which he must first prepare before he can 
enjoy and digest them — so, too, in practice they form a part of human life and human 
activity. In a physical sense, man lives only from these natural products, whether in the 
form of nourishment, heating, clothing, shelter, etc. The universality of man manifests 
itself in practice in that universality which makes the whole of nature his inorganic 
body, (1) as a direct means of life and (2) as the matter, the object, and the tool of his 
life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body — that is to say, nature insofar as it is not 
the human body. Man lives from nature — i.e., nature is his body — and he must 
maintain a continuing dialogue with it is he is not to die. To say that man’s physical and 
mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a 
part of nature (PE notes). 
Capitalism, it has been said over and over, has triumphed as the political economic system. 
It is the sole remaining alternative. Such a view is bolstered time and time again, and from 
every visible source. Whether claiming to be “left” or “right” leaning, scholars, politicians, and 
public pundits of all persuasions express the view that the political economic system we live 
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in can comfortably be called capitalism (Fukuyama, 1995; Harvey, 2001; Hutton & Giddens, 
2000; Jessop, 2002; Soros, 2000). “New capitalism” (Fairclough, Giddens), “global 
capitalism” (Jessop), “hypercapitalism” (Graham), “postmodern capitalism” (Harvey)—the 
constant flow of descriptors claiming that capitalism, in some form or other, is alive and 
thriving comes from practically every sphere of public discourse. This has a number of 
unhelpful effects, the most deleterious of which is that it offers no alternative understandings 
of the system in which we live. In such a situation, all that is left to contention is whether 
capitalism is good or bad, whether it makes things worse or better, and so forth. So, 
depending on one’s attitude towards capitalism, when arguments about political economic 
systems are put forward, the scripted arguments “for” and “against” are trotted out and 
played, over and over, like a badly scratched record, leading to the inevitable conclusion that 
capitalism is unstoppable and universal, for better or worse, and that we must therefore 
embrace, fight, or adapt to the system.  
The resultant lack of alternative understandings has been exacerbated by Marxians who 
have attempted to characterise the current system in terms of capitalism without realising 
that a) it is probably not at all capitalist, and b) even if it is, there are no critical arguments 
against capitalism that can have any beneficial effects in the current context because their 
function is to bolster a false ideal. That is to say: any arguments about capitalism—for or 
against—only serve to bolster the widespread notion that capitalism is a universal, global 
system of political economic relations when, in my assessment, nothing could be further 
from the facts. 
Marx’s most valuable legacy, as I see it, is a very powerful analytical approach for 
understanding our social world that synthesises synchronic and diachronic views. It is an 
approach based on the analysis of social relations and focused on what and how we 
produce. It is therefore focused on what we do, which includes to some significant degree 
what we say and mean. The challenge for Marxians, from the inside of an almost 
incomprehensibly violent and complex system, is to understand what relations define this 
system, how it has been produced, and what we can do to change it for the better.  
Notes 
1. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Marxian Futures workshop held at Cornell 
University in 2004. 
2. ‘though every capital is a sum of commodities — i.e., of exchange values — it does not follow that 
every sum of commodities, of exchange values, is capital.’ (Marx, 1847 – Wage Labour and 
Capital) 
3. It is worth noting here the employees benefit trusts and the money of the general public are 
treated as separate. Also, no mention is made of the monies involved in the complex of ownership 
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of News Corporation and General Motors, the bulk of which also involves and represents the 
savings of “the general public”.  
4. For the sake of convenience, I use the term language here in the broadest sense. I include 
computer languages, images, symbols, and sounds by which meaning may be exchanged. I 
recognise that a more formal definition of language would separate these forms of communication 
into various types. 
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